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INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION: THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT, NEW MEXICO, AND TRIBES IN THE
WAKE OF CHEROMIAH
REED C. EASTERWOOD*
I. BACKGROUND
Legal fictions have long been important tools in evolving group expectations and
protected rights within a political process.' The "sovereign equality of the states"
to the federal government is a legal fiction. 2 So too is the designation of the
American Indian Tribe as a "dependent domestic nation" endowed with inherent
sovereignty, yet defeated by conquest. 3 These two fictions have been important
engines in developing settled expectations with respect to both sovereigns under the
United States.4 But historically, state and tribal sovereigns have operated against
one another in asserting and evolving their respective substantive law and rights.'
This opposition between States and Tribes was a product of Anglo American
"conquest," which culminated in the writing of the United States Constitution.6
The federal government mutually excluded the laws of States and Tribes from
one another at its inception. Common law tradition codified in the absolute federal
sovereign would apply more or less to the States, subject to the States' consent. But
the newly minted federal government proceeded to declare the legal status of Tribes
as conquered separate political entities, dependent on and subject only to the
plenary power of the United States by its power under Article I, Section 8, Clause
3, and Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution.7 In other words, conquered peoples

* University of New Mexico School of Law Candidate for Juris Doctor May 2008. The author recognizes
the term American "Indian" is not an accurate description. But this endemic terminology serves as a helpful
metaphor: contradiction is Indian law. The author also wishes to thank Professors Gloria Valencia-Weber and Jos6
L. Martinez and editors Nikko Harada and Seth McMillan for invaluable assistance.
1. See generally 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Stanley N. Katz
ed., Oxford Press 1979) (1769).
2.

HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF

CONFLICTING RIGHTS 5 (1996).
3. See infra Part IH.A; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 3 (1831).
4. Compare Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (grounding the origin of substantive rights
incorporation to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), with Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (grounding affirmation of Indian substantive rights incorporation to the Tribes
through the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968).
5. See infra Part IU.A.
6. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); infra Part III.A. M'lntosh states in the stipulated facts
that "the [European] right of soil was previously obtained by purchase or conquest, from the particular Indian tribe
or nation by which the soil was claimed and held; or the consent of such tribe or nation was secured." M'Intosh,
21 U.S. at 545. The stipulated facts go on to state that by the commencement of the war between France and Britain
of 1756,
the Western Confederacy of Indians.. .were the allies of France in the war, but not her subjects,
never having been in any manner conquered by her, and held the country in absolute
sovereignty, as independent nations, both as to the right ofjurisdiction and sovereignty.. .these
Indians, after the treaty, became the allies of Great Britain, living under her protection as they
had before lived under that of France, but were free and independent, owing no allegiance to any
foreign power whatever, and holding their lands in absolute property.
Id. at 547-48. The case goes on to stipulate that all Tribes about the colony of Virginia at this time were completely
sovereign and not conquered in any way, but parties to Treaties. Id. at 548-50. Thus, the notion of conquest that
this case relies on to invalidate Indian title is counterfactual.
7. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 558-59 (1832), abrogatedon other groundsas recognizedin
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361-62 (2001); see also infra Part ITI.A.
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would be subject to the mercy of the conqueror. Congress alone determined the
autonomy or political viability of the Indian Tribes.8 Congress chose to recognize
"conquered tribes," once great and preexisting Anglo invasion for centuries, not
divested of inherent sovereignty. 9
Today, judicial review might apply to either sovereign. The laws of the State are
to concede to the laws of the United States when their subject matter is in conflict
with the latter.' ° And, in the aftermath of assimilation and reorganization efforts, the
laws of the Indian nations remain subject to the traditional "special relationship" andI
"dependent domestic nation status" the federal government has assigned to Tribes.
Thus, the divergent paths of the States and Tribes to assertions and advancement
of autonomy are either ratified or rejected by the federal sovereign, generally
spoken, through the medium of the judiciary. In other words, the patriarchal
authority and integrity of the federal government in large part is dependent upon the
two sovereigns' ability to supply developed precedent to the federal sovereign. 2
This parentage, however, should be reserved so that its "children" may grow, but
learn from the federal courts.' 3 As a result, the judiciary should be equipped to
deliver principled decisions.
U. INTRODUCTION
This Comment will focus on recent decisions and trends in Indian Law signaling
that State and tribal governments have a vested interest in working as partners,
crafting mutually inclusive relationships that in turn can better guide the federal
sovereign toward democratic principles. As such, it will address two main areas.
First, Congress has understood that its trust responsibilities to the Tribes are best
served by loosening restrictions and allowing Tribes to privately contract with
States or other outside parties on their own terms. 4 This allows Tribes to

8. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (holding that Congress was assumed to have
acted in good faith on behalf of tribes even when it breached its fiduciary duties as trustee to fraudulently abrogate
the terms of a treaty).
9. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); see also infra Part mll.A.
10. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (standing for the now universally accepted proposition that
it is the duty of the judiciary to interpret what the law is and overrule any state or federal law that is found in
opposition to the laws of the United States or the supremacy of the federal constitution).
11. See U.S. CONST. art. VL cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. M, § 2, cl. 2; Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561 (standing for
the proposition that no state law shall have any force on tribal land if the federal government has preempted it); see
also Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1; infra Part M.A.
12. But see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,203 (1978), supersededin part by statute,
Pub. L. No. 101-511 § 8077(b) (1990) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000)), as recognized in
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 205-07 (2004) (announcing that the "unspoken assumption" rather than the
previously applicable "clear and plain intention" canon of construction applied to abrogate Indian rights, allowing
the Court to hold that tribal courts had no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians for tribal code crimes). See also
discussion infra Parts II.D, V.
13. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980) (recognizing that Delaware
TribalBusiness Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977), laid to rest the notion that "congressional good faith"
was based on a presumption that relations between the United States and tribes were a political matter not amenable
to judicial review); see also discussion infra Part ILC-D.
14. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450f (2000);
see also discussion infra Part II.C.
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substantially provide for their own health, welfare, and safety." The Congress has
also learned by its failed policies of the past that self-determination is enhanced
when Tribes provide for their own political integrity, adopting their own constitutions and creating strong tribal judiciaries. 6
But, in the wake of the self-determination era, the federal courts have adopted neocolonial tendencies instead. 7 These tendencies abandon established Indian canons of
construction, resulting in new doctrine that has turned the Marshall trilogy against
tribal autonomy." The result is judicial encroachment upon tribal power authorized
by Congress. 19 Such judicial encroachment upon state legislatures is not new.
But
2
judicial encroachment on self-determination is apparently a recent invention. 0
This first section argues that modem federal Indian policy is fundamentally
sound because it affords Indian nations access to federal republican norms on their
own terms. 2' Tribes have organized governments capable of providing for their own
citizens' health, welfare, and safety, lessening the burden of the federal government's fiduciary duty to the Tribes.22 This should be mutually beneficial once
federal courts realize rational basis review with respect to Indian law and thus

15. See, e.g., Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (2000) (establishing low cost financing that
will be reimbursable as Tribes exercise management and utilization of their own resources); see also discussion
infra Part IlI.C.
16. See Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 476-477 (2000); see also discussion infra Parts
I1.B-C.
17. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212 (holding that "Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and
to punish non-Indians"); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353,365 (2001) (holding that States have inherent jurisdiction
on reservations); Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from
ConstitutionalPrinciplesand the Crafting ofJudicialSmallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405, 407 (2003)
(discussing the modem Court's construction ofjudicial plenary power as lacking constitutional origins by invading
"Congress' enumerated and exclusive power in relations with Indian tribes"); David H. Getches, Beyond Indian
Law: The Rehnquist Court'sPursuitof States' Rights, Color-BlindJusticeand Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L
REV. 267, 270 (2001) (asserting that the decidedly state-centric Rehnquist Court has engaged in little historical
analysis with respect to Indian cases, which has left the Indian Commerce clause-the clause the framers had
designated to fulfill the exclusive political relationship between tribes and the United States for centuries past-in
desuetude); see also discussion infra Part M1.D.
18. See discussion infra Part ln.A and note 33; see also discussion infra Part i.D. Compare Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (holding that Tribes have no civil jurisdiction over non-members within a
reservation except where a non-member has entered into a contractual relationship with a tribe or an individual
member or the actions of the non-member so threaten the health, welfare, and safety of the tribe that the Tribe's
political integrity is threatened if jurisdiction does not lie in tribal court), with Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515,
553-54 (1832), abrogatedin part as recognized in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361-62 (2001) (holding that
tribes entered treaties with inherent sovereignty, not divested by Congress, to make their own rules and be governed
by them); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 256 (1959).
19. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), supersededby statute, Pub. L. No. 101-511 §8077(b) (1990)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000)), as recognizedin United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193,205-07
(2004); see also discussion infra Part i.D.
20. Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruledby Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483 (1955), with United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980) (criticizing but not
overruling a decision that encroached on principles of Indian sovereignty from the same era as Lochner. Lone Wolf
v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903)). See also discussion infra Part M.D.
21. See generally Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 1 PUB. PAPERS 564 (July 8, 1970)
[hereinafter Message to Congress]; see also discussion infra Part M.C.
22. See, e.g., Ronald N. Johnson, Indian Casinos: Another Tragedy of the Commons, in SELFDETERMINATION: THE OTHER PATH FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 214,220-21 (2006) (noting that the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA) had resulted in 40 percent of participating U.S. Tribes' annual gaming revenues
equaling the combined annual gaming revenues of Nevada and New Jersey by 2003); see also discussion infra Part
I.C.
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mature to the level of Congress.23 Therefore, tribal governments might be governed
by their own laws and develop their own precedent, which is also a judicial decree
of the Court. 4
Second, the States in conjunction with Tribes in their midst can play a key role
in encouraging the federal judiciary toward principled decisions. 5 By temporarily
avoiding the judiciary's hostility toward Indian self-determination, tribal and state
forums can build consistent precedent. This precedent can inform a fledgling
rational basis review with respect to tribal court decisions. 26 New Mexico is located
in the heart of Indian country, and decisions originating here such as Cheromiahv.
United States27 suggest positive mechanisms to (1) protect and advance the adjudicative turf of both sovereigns by (2) staying out of federal court and certifying
questions of law in either a tribal or stateforum.2" Simply put, Cheromiah tactics
could also work and be put to better use by building comity between state and tribal
fora. Consistent precedent created by Tribes and States in partnership is vital to
local economic interests, which subsume the health and welfare concerns of both
New Mexico and the Tribes.29
This second section will argue that a cohesive body of law with respect to New
Mexico Tribes and the State is achievable and desirable. The two sovereigns are
already in significant economic and political partnerships and should want to maximize their investments in order to improve their joint infrastructure.3" Procedural
and other structural mechanisms such as arbitration and the amendment of tribal
laws and contracts can go a long way toward creating trust, which is essential to this
endeavor. 3 A consistent, published tribal precedent forged by the States and the
Tribes could educate the federal judiciary in matters already understood by
Congress.
I. MODERN FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY:
DISCOVERING SELF-DETERMINATION
A. The Initial Understanding
In the beginning of the Union, Chief Justice John Marshall penned a series of
cases known as "the Marshall trilogy," which determined the legal status of Tribes

23. See supra note 20.
24. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1959); see also discussion infra Parts IlI.D, IV.B.
25. See Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D.N.M. 1999). There, the court propounded a
certified question of law to a tribal court to determine how a wrongful death tort might proceed under tribal law
in a Federal Tort Claims Act claim. Id. at 1309-10. Certified questions of law could easily be used as a mechanism
to build precedent between state and tribal fora with respect to other issues. See also discussion infra Part IV.B.
26. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980); see also discussion infra Parts
IV.B, IILC.
27. 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295.
28. Id.; see also discussion infra Part W.A.
29. See NMSA 1978, § 29-1-1 l(C)(8) (2006) (providing for deputization of tribal and pueblo officers to
act as New Mexico police officers outside of Indian country); see also discussion infra Part IV.B.
30. See, e.g., NMSA, 1978 § 11 - 13-2 (2006) (providing for New Mexico's revenue sharing of tribal gaming
pursuant to the IGRA); see also discussion infra Part IV.B.
31. See C&L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411 (2001)
(holding that a carefully constructed arbitration clause that was acceptable to the Tribe waived sovereign immunity
without explicitly stating such waiver); see also discussion infra Part I.B.
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within the borders of the expanding United States.32 The trilogy designated
"conquered tribes" no longer foreign nations per se, but redefined Tribes as
"dependent domestic nations."33 Under this definition, the Tribes were separate
political entities with no standing to bring a cause of action before the courts.34
Indian dependency upon the federal government also meant that the United States
retained conquered Indian lands in fee simple.35 But aboriginal or "Indian title" was
observed whereby Tribes had a mere possessory right to the use and occupancy of
such lands subject to the will of Congress's exclusive power to regulate commerce
with the Indian Tribes.36 In this manner, the doctrine of "discovery" would not
allow Tribes to compete with the infant nation in foreign affairs.37
Congress primarily exercised its powers in making treaties with the Tribes as the
nation expanded westward.3 8 The Court held that when entering treaties, Tribes had
ceded lands to the federal government in exchange for the protection of their
inherent sovereignty, which had not been divested, to make their own laws and be
governed by them. 39This essentially meant protection from encroachment from nonIndians and States upon land reserved for and governed by the Tribes. 4 In this
had no force on Indian land because Congress's
regard, the Court held that state law
41
plenary power had preempted it.
Taken as a whole, the Marshall trilogy advanced the proposition that "a special
relationship" was formed between the Tribes and the federal government. 42 This
relationship generated a distinct form of trust where the United States is trustee and
the Tribes are the beneficiaries.43 In this regard, the United States is under a
fiduciary duty to act in good faith on behalf of the Tribes."4
The trilogy, however, sublimated an explicit assumption that the trust relationship would be temporary.45 In other words, the Court opined this relationship would
one day be irrelevant when the Tribes assimilated into the dominant Anglo-

32. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), abrogatedin partas recognizedin Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353,361-62 (2001).
33. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. This legal designation kept the dual scheme of federalism intact: Tribes
were not States. Id.
34. Id. at 39.
35. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 584.
36. Id. at 587, 603.
37. Id. at 573 (discussing the doctrine of discovery that enabled European nations to rationalize complete
ownership of aboriginal lands because these lands were discovered by Europeans. The European "discovery" of
the continent subsequently, and by convention, enabled an assignment of a mere possessory right to aboriginal
peoples.); see also discussion infra Part ll.D, notes 135-144 and accompanying text.
38. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 549 (1832), abrogatedin part as recognized in Nevada v. Hicks,
533 U.S. 353, 361-62 (2001).
39. Id. at 553-54; Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218 (1959).
40. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561-62.
41. Id. at 561; see also McClanahan v. Ariz. Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
42. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (noting in dicta that "[Indians'] relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian").
43. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983).
44. Id.
45. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543,589-90 (1823); CherokeeNation, 30 U.S. at 23; Worcester,31
U.S. at 593; Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466 (1984); see also American Indian Trust Fund Management
Reform Act, 25 C.F.R. § 1200.3(b) (2006).
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American culture governed by dual federalism. 6 And surely the Tribes would want
to do so, because the dominant culture was assumed superior.17 This explicit
assumption proved wrong because Western cultural values did not understand and
could not defeat tribalism.48 Past congressional attempts to defeat tribalism have
been disastrous to all three sovereigns.49
B. The Failuresof Assimilation
The Dawes Act of 1887'o ushered in the Allotment Era, a reform attempt to
destroy tribalism and convert all Indians into farmers."' Under this policy,
individual members of federally recognized Tribes were forced to accept a parcel
of land for farming.52 Remaining tribal land or "surplus lands" would be sold off to
white settlers.53 Significantly, the individually allotted Indian parcels were granted
in fee simple to Indians, subject to the individuals proving "civilized" abilities to
manage land. 4 As a result, not only the selling of surplus lands, but outright graft
on the part of non-Indians, induced naive tribal members to sell allotments
contributing to the loss of approximately ninety million acres of reservation lands
held under trust.5 This interpolation of trust doctrine by Congress was formally
rationalized during the Allotment Era in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,56 where the Court
held that Indian treaty rights could be breached if Congress determined that such
breach was in the interest of the Tribes.57
The compelled assimilation under Allotment in the "interest" of the Tribes was
a substantial breach of Congress's fiduciary duty to the Tribes.58 The Dawes Act,
supporting a policy of accommodating land-hungry white settlers thinly veiled as
an attempt to better the Tribes, resulted in extreme poverty on what remained of the
reservations. 59 Parcels given to Indian individuals to farm were small and not suited

46. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 589-90.
47. Id.
48. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN
CONSTTUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 63-68 (1987); see also discussion infra Part 11I.B.
49. See discussion infra Part MI.B.

50. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 334-358 (2000)).
51.

Id.

52. Comment, TribalSelf-Government and the Indian ReorganizationAct of1934,70 MICH. L REv. 955,
959 (1972).
53. Id.
54. Id.; see also LeAnn Larson LaFave, South Dakota'sForcedFee Indian Land Claims: Will Land Owners
Be Liablefor Government's Wrongdoing?, 30 S.D. L. REV. 59,65-67 (1984). The article documents government
"blue ribbon competency commissions" that were designed to achieve western literacy and familiarity with
domestic practices with respect to Indians. Id. at 66. Confirmation of competency included legal change of Indian
males' names to generic Anglo names and a ceremony to memorialize competency in which the Indian male "shoots
the last arrow." Id. at 66 n.49.
55. See Comment, supra note 52, at 960; see also Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1132-33 (D.D.C.
1976) (documenting an outright federal government conspiracy during the Allotment Era that undermined the
Creek government, recognized by treaty, in order for Oklahoma to achieve statehood).
56. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
57. Id. at 566 (holding that Congress was assumed to have acted in good faith on behalf of these Tribes,
rather than fraudulently, when it did not obtain the requisite three-fourths of adult male Kiowa, Comanche, and
Apache signatures necessary to abrogate the terms of a treaty).
58. See discussion infra Part III.C.
59. See generally INST. FOR GOV'T RESEARCH, STUDIES IN ADMINISTRATION, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN
ADMINISTRATION (1928). The report detailed abysmal poverty with respect to individual Indians supposedly
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for farming in the mostly ard lands of reservations,' and the United States' "one
size fits all" approach to Tribes failed to understand the differing cultural values of
separate political entities. 6 On balance, tribalism survived Allotment and ironically
left Congress with a greater fiduciary burden, which Congress presumably initially
intended to lessen with respect to what remained of Tribes and their assets.62 Thus,
Congress felt compelled to return to legitimate trust principles consistent with a
guardianship.63
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA)' rehabilitated trust doctrine by
prohibiting the allotment of reservation land to any Indian, individually and in fee
simple. 65 This effectively repealed the Dawes Act, 66 but the IRA vested authority
in the Tribes themselves rather than local Indian agents.6 7 For example, the IRA
prohibits alienation of Indian land or assets to any interest other than the Tribe.68
Furthermore, the Secretary of the Interior would now make loans to the Tribe rather
than to individuals who had a hard time repaying the loans.6 9 Some of these funds
were to be used for educational purposes, earmarked to cover tuition and other
expenses. 7° Thus, the IRA illustrates an example of tribalism surviving assimilation,
but with a new twist: Tribes had greater control of their own destinies."'
Greater self-control of tribal destinies was accomplished under the IRA by
democratic principles. For the first time, federal legislation did not compel all
Tribes to come under an Act, giving Tribes a vote to adopt or reject the IRA. 72 Most
importantly, sections sixteen and seventeen of the Act allowed for the formation of
73
Indian constitutions and issuance of charters for incorporation respectively.
During the two-year period within which Tribes could accept or reject the IRA,
258 elections were held. In these elections, 181 Tribes (129,750 Indians)
accepted the Act and 77 Tribes (86,365 Indians, including 45,000 Navajos)
rejected it....Within 12 years, 161 constitutions and 131 corporate charters had
been adopted pursuant to the IRA.' 4

benefited by Anglo agricultural practices grounded in fee simple ownership. Id. at 430-546. Significantly, the
report recommended rehabilitating the tribes to provide their own social services rather than rely on the government
that had always understaffed and under funded this effort. Id. at 8, 629-45.
60. See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 142 (5th ed. 2005).
61. See WILKINSON, supra note 48, at 68, 77.
62. See Comment, supranote 52, at 959 (stating that one intended consequence ofAllotment was to "relieve
the Government of the need for further supervision of Indian affairs and life").
63. See discussion infra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
64. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2000)).
65. Id.
66. Id. (stating that Indian lands would again be held communally in trust for Tribes by the federal
government, rather than allotted individually to Indians with the subsequent right to sell these lands).
67. 25 U.S.C. § 463.
68. Id.
69. Id. § 470.
70. Id. §471.
71. See WILKINSON, supra note 48, at 68.
72. 25 U.S.C. § 478.
73. Id. §§ 476-477; see, e.g., CHEYENNE-ARAPAHOTRIBES OF OKLAHOMA CONsTrrrON AND BY-LAws,
available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/constitution/Chyn-aph.html#preamble.
74. Comment, supra note 52, at 972 (footnotes omitted).
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Thus, the Tribes could organize for their common welfare under section sixteen and
regulate their own business practices under section seventeen. 75 Finally, IRA funds
were "used to reacquire" some allotted land to improve Tribes' ability to manage
land.7 6 But the legacy of Allotment created a "patch-work" of jurisdictional
nightmares because non-Indian fee land was now within Indian reservations, which
were once again considered inherently sovereign.77
Non-Indian fee land within Indian country is inimical to inherent sovereignty
because it erodes political integrity. Thus, the germ of Lone Wolf that encouraged
the assimilationist assumptions of the Marshall trilogy could not entirely be
overruled.78 On the contrary, Lone Wolf perpetuated a line of cases hostile to
inherent sovereignty.79 With no judicial review checking unprincipled decisions,
impatient reformist attempts on the part of Congress could and did surface quickly
to wreak havoc, despite the inchoate accomplishments of the IRA legislation.8"
Post-World War 11, Congress again became agitated to achieve assimilation as
soon as possible under Republican President Eisenhower, himself fearful of the
"danger[s] of big government.""1 As Eisenhower warned, "those who would stay
free must stand eternal watch against excessive concentration of power in government."82 As historian Angie Debo countered, "World War II had its effect: with the
expanding agriculture, envious eyes were again fixed on the Indians' land at the
same time that the national attention was focused elsewhere."8 3 Thus, the pretext of
trust doctrine would again be used to accelerate assimilation as freedom from
federal control was considered to be in the best interest of Indians individually.84
In this period, freedom from federal control manifested itself as House
Concurrent Resolution 108,85 otherwise known as the Termination Act. This Act
was introduced in June of 1953 and endorsed by the Senate without debate as
declared Indian policy. 86 The Act was designed to "free" Indians of the burdens of
federal oversight so that they could "assume their full responsibilities as American

75. 25 U.S.C. §§ 476-477; see also discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing the enormous influx of capital
through Indian casinos operated and managed by Tribes).
76. Comment, supra note 52, at 976.
77. See discussion infra Part III.D.
78. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), abrogationrecognizedin Littlewolf v. Lujan, 877 F.2d
1058 (D.C. Cir. 1989), distinguishedby Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
79. CompareLone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 556 (holding that treaties with Tribes may be abrogated), United States
v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,379 (1886) (asserting that there are only two sovereigns: the United States and the "states
of the Union"), and United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881) (recognizing Colorado's jurisdiction
over crimes committed on the Ute reservation "by a white man upon a white man" by operation of equal footing
doctrine), with Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376,384-85 (1896) (holding that Indian Tribes retain the power to make
law because this power existed prior to the U.S. Constitution), Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 570-72 (1883)
(holding that Indians retain criminal jurisdiction on Indian lands with respect to crimes between members), and
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515,561 (1832) (holding that state law can have no force on Indian land), abrogated
in partas recognized in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361-62 (2001).
80. See discussion infra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
81. See Gary Orfield, A Study of the Termination Policy (1966), reprinted in GETCHES ET AL., supra note
60, at 200.
82. Id. at 200-01.
83. ANGIE DEBO, HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNrrED STATES 301 (1970).

84. See discussion supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
85. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
86. Orfield, supra note 81, at 201.
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citizens. 87 The Act was overwhelmingly opposed by most of the Tribes, but some
groups within several Tribes favored termination, largely to be able to mortgage or
sell their land without government interference.88
A few days after the adoption of the policy, Congress passed Public Law 28089
giving specific States power to extend their civil and criminal law over Indian
reservations.9" Public Law 280, if adopted by a State, did not require tribal consent
until 1968 when President Johnson signed a bill mandating consent. 91 Thus, tribal
sovereignty effectively ended because States imposed legislative and judicial
authority. Along with the termination of tribal sovereignty, federal assistance to
Tribes decreased.9 2 Public Law 280 States, however, were precluded from taxing
Indian reservations or trust lands in order to finance their new jurisdictional
obligations.93
Decreased federal funding exacted heavy financial burdens on Public Law 280
States. Accordingly, States began to have second thoughts in adopting Public Law
280 because protecting the health, welfare, and safety of newly incorporated
reservations proved expensive.94 For example, the terminated Menominee Tribe's
corporation subsidy would now be funded by its sawmill operation in an effort to
shore up Wisconsin's tax deficits because the cost of the Tribe's services exceeded
the State resources. 95 The burden was too great for the Menominee and Wisconsin,
compelling Congress to authorize $800,000.00 annually for four years in tax
assistance.96
Additionally, the federal government could not fully relieve itself of its treaty
obligations, which were construed by the courts to be exempt from termination.
Thus, the courts decided a series of cases that awarded partial guardianship for
protection of Tribes' traditional hunting and fishing rights. 97 Thus, the unintended
consequence of the Termination Era was the survival of tribalism over assimilation,
in spite of Tribes having no control over their own destinies.98

87. Id.
88. Id. at 202-03.
89. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360
(2000)).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) authorized mandatory jurisdiction over Tribes within
Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin without tribal consent. See also DEBO, supranote
83, at 352-53.
91. DEBO, supra note 83, at 353.
92. Id. at 351,376.
93. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379 (1976) (holding that "the legislative history of Pub. L. 280
and the application of canons of construction applicable to congressional statutes claimed to terminate Indian
immunities" foreclosed a grant of the power to tax Indian lands with respect to the States).
94. See CAROLEGoLDBERG-AmBROSE, PLANTINGTAIL FEATHERS:TRIBALSuRvIVALANDPuBucLAW280,
at 11-12 (1997) (explaining that Public Law 280 is essentially a federally unfunded mandate and that this fact,
ironically, led to more "lawlessness," which the Act was designed to remedy, because state police and other state
agencies could not afford to extend services previously performed under federal agencies and aid).
95. DEBO, supra note 83, at 310.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); Kimball v. Callahan, 493
F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Felter, 752 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985).
98. See WILKINSON, supra note 48, at 75-78.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

Even more ironic, the goal of termination also had the unintended consequence
of accelerating tribal autonomy.9 9 The National Congress of American Indians
(NCAI), organized in the mid-1940s, alerted individual Tribes designated for
termination to successfully avoid it in some instances and at least mitigate
disastrous consequences in others."° In 1961, the NCAI held its largest gathering
in decades where over seventy Tribes rejected the Termination Act and asserted
their right to make and be governed by their own laws.'0 ' The policy of termination
would be abandoned in the 1960s and repealed by Republican President Nixon in
1970.102

03
In conclusion, tribalism again survived "one size fits all" assimilation.1
Congress had learned through infliction of great poverty during the Allotment Era
that Tribes were separate cultural entities with differing cultural values. The IRA
provided Tribes mechanisms for legitimate inherent sovereignty to address and
develop this reality on their own terms under the protection of the trust doctrine. In
hindsight, the Termination Act would only accelerate tribal impulses recently
recognized by the IRA. And coercion, instead of consent, only increased the trust
burden of the United States because dependent domestic nations were previously
not nurtured to manage their own affairs. The States, presented with the opportunity
during the Termination era to govern Tribes, mostly declined because the financial
burden was considered too great. Tribes, on the other hand, had organized and were
equal to the task.

C. Indian Self-Determination: 1970 to Present
President Nixon asked Congress to repeal the Termination Act in his Message
to Congress July 8, 1970."° In this message, Nixon explicitly endorsed selfdetermination, stating a new national policy goal:
to strengthen the Indian's sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of
community. We must assure the Indian that he can assume control of his own life
without being separated involuntarily from the tribal group. And we must make
it clear that Indians can become independent of Federal control without being cut
off from Federal concern and Federal support.0 5
Nixon went on to state that federal programs had never been consistent with the
promise of self-determination because,
as to whether a Federal program will be turned over to Indian administration, it
is the Federal authorities and not the Indian people who finally make that
decision.
This situation should be reversed. In my judgment it should be up to the
Indian Tribe to determine whether it is willing and able to assume administrative
99. See DEBO, supra note 83, at 375.
100. See id. at 371.
101. See STEPHEN CORNEaL, THE RErIRN OF THE NATIVE (1988), reprintedin GETCH_ ET"AL., supranote

60, at 218.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See infra Part ILC.
See WILKINSON, supra note 48, at 53-86.
Message to Congress, supra note 21.
Id. at 566-67.
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responsibility for a service program which is presently administered by a Federal
agency. 16

Commentators have criticized the Nixon address and its shift in federal policy
because Nixon's administrative actions contradicted his rhetoric."t 7 Under the
banner of self-determination, powerful corporate interests could directly control
Indian governments formed to do business with the federal government.0 8 As
Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz notes, "this strategy parallels neocolonialist strategy in Third
World countries."' 1 9
A further neo-colonialist strategy of substituting parallel movements for those
perceived as less threatening to federal government interests in an effort to pacify
civil discontent is provocative. The American Indian Movement (AIM), a political
separatist group of limited membership, was alleged to be publicly promoted by the
Nixon administration to divert attention away from domestic anti-war opposition
deemed a greater threat to the prosecution of the Vietnam War. 0 In other words,
"substitution" was hoped to dilute wider and growing opposition to a sagging war
effort.'
AIM was patterned after the Black Panthers, a militant anti-war black liberation
movement perceived by the federal government as a grave threat to domestic and
international interests. Federal agents thought the Panthers were gathering wide
membership and substantial publicity. Leading members of the Panthers were
assassinated in the late 1960s, allegedly by the FBI.'12
Attempts to use parallel movements to pacify civil discontent can also have
unintended consequences. As Ortiz concludes, "The effects of such policies are
usually effective in defusing explosive situations, but in the long term, often
actually broaden movements. Such strategy sometimes backfires, also. The environmental movement has itself become an explosive and widespread one.""I3 Likewise,
self-determination has broadened tribal autonomy, and Congress seems to have also
taken President Nixon at his word." 4
For over half a century, Congress's power over Indian affairs has been exercised
on behalf of furthering tribal sovereignty and economic self-sufficiency, and this

106. Id. at 567.
107. See Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz, Forewordto JACK FORBES, NATIVE AMERICANS AND NIXoN 9 (1981);

DEBO,supranote 83, at 337 ("At the same time Nixon designated Governor Hickel as his choice for [S]ecretary
of the Interior. Throughout American history from the admission of Kentucky to the Union in 1792 to that of
Oklahoma in 1907, appointing the governor of any frontier State to a position supervising Native rights would have
been equivalent to appointing a wolf as the guardian of the sheepfold.").
108. Ortiz, supra note 107, at 11.
109. Id. at 19.
110. Id. at 9-11.
111. Id.
112. MIA: History: USA: The Black Panther Party, http://www.ucc.ie/acad/socstud/tmp-storelmia_2/
Library/history/usa/workers/black-panthers/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2008). For the counter proposition that "[n]o one,
inside or outside the [AIM] movement, has so far been able to destroy the will and strength of AIM's solidarity,"
see Laura Waterman Wittstock & Elaine J. Salinas, A Brief History of the American Indian Movement,
http://www.aimovement.org/ggc/history.html (last visited May 21, 2008).
113. ORTIZ,supra note 107, at 11.
114. See infra note 116.
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has been greatly accelerated post-Nixon.115 Most importantly, "Indians have learned
legislation has been passed over Indian opposition since
how to lobby....No" Indian
16
'
1968.
of
ICRA
the
The modem U.S. Supreme Court initially validated the Marshall line of cases
with respect to self-determination and even extended judicial review to rehabilitate
Indian trust doctrine. In Morton v. Mancari"7 Justice Blackmun affirmed the
Court's commitment to IRA Indian hiring preferences within the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA). Rejecting the non-Indian respondent's Equal Protection claim,
Blackmun noted, "If these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly
designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an
entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and
the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be
jeopardized.""' Regarding judicial review, Justice Blackmun in United States v.
Sioux Nation of Indians"9 held Lone Wolf in disrepute, noting,
[I]t seems that the Court's conclusive presumption of congressional good faith
was based in large measure on the idea that relations between this Nation and the
Indian tribes are a political matter, not amendable to judicial review. That view,
of course, has long since been discredited in takings cases, and was expressly
laid to rest in Delaware TribalBus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977).1 20
The Court held that the political question of Tribes comprising an independent bar
to judicial review did not apply.' 2' Thus, the Court applied a heightened standard
22
of review to congressional action regarding the following facts of the case. 1
Sioux Nation involved the restoration of treaty rights in accordance with
principled notions of common law trust doctrine. 123 There, the Sioux Tribe was
awarded just compensation for an unconstitutional taking of the Black Hills in

115. See Daniel M. Rosenfelt, Towarda More Coherent Policyfor FundingIndian Education,40 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 190,202 (1976); see also Indian Financing Act of 1974,25 U.S.C. §§ 1451, 1461-1469 (2000)
(establishing a revolving loan fund and extending low-cost reimbursable financing as tribes exercise management
and utilization of their own resources); Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C.
§ 450a-n (2000) (consolidating the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to contract with Indian organizations
and when declining to contract, provide objections in writing to tribal organizations to provide Tribes assistance
in either overcoming the stated objections or provide a hearing for the tribal organization to appeal). The Act also
provides increased funding for reservation school districts and amends Public Law 815 "to place Indian schools
in the highest priority category together with military bases and natural disasters." Rosenfelt, supra,at 202; Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1903, 1911-1923 (2000) (enabling Tribes and tribal parents to
determine proper custody with respect to Indian children adopted by non-members); Tribal Self Governance
Amendments of 2000,25 U.S.C. § 458aaa (2000) (allowing tribes to completely take over Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) or Indian Health Service (IHS)contracts if previously demonstrating successful management of these
contracts); The Native American Business Development, Trade Promotion, and Tourism Act of 2000, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 4301-4307 (2000); Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1987 (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000).
116. WILKINSON,supranote 48, at 82-83.
117. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
118. Id. at 552; see also GErCHES ET AL., supra note 60, at 232 ("Today about 90 percent of the 10,746
employees in the BIA are Indians. Most of the high level Indian policy positions within the Interior Department and
the BIA are now held by Indians.").
119. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
120. Id. at 413.
121. Id.
122. Id. at415-16.
123. Id. at416-17.
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violation of the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty. 21 4The Court did not question Congress's
plenary power, but found "this power to control and manage [is] not absolute. While
extending to all appropriate measures for protecting and advancing the tribe, it [is]
subject to limitations inhering in.. .a guardianship and to pertinent constitutional
restrictions., 125 Thus, Sioux Nation stands for the proposition that congressional
action regarding Indian law, although plenary, is not immune to heightened review
when it violates the Constitution or trust1doctrine
principles. 126 Otherwise, Congress
27
is afforded deference in Indian affairs.
Tribal courts and administrative organizations vested with the authority to make
law and regulate affairs within their borders are a manifestation of Congress's
plenary power, consistent with trust doctrine. 128 Yet tribal court proceedings and administrative decisions are routinely denied rational basis review before the Court.'29
This lack of deference happens most often when a non-member subject to regulation
on tribal land claims the tribal court has no jurisdiction. 130 Because self-determination is relatively new as enforced policy, tribal precedent showing efficient and fair
dealings with non-members is lacking.' 3 ' Therefore, the modem Court, inconsistent

124. Id. at 424.
125. Id. at 415 (citing United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1935)). In other words,
Congress's presumption of "good faith" in meeting its trust responsibilities is not enough where facts indicate
otherwise, and judicial review will follow.
126. Id. at 416-17 ('Ie 'good faith effort' and 'transmutation of property' concepts referred to in Fort
Berthold are opposite sides of the same coin. They reflect the traditional rule that a trustee may change the form
of trust assets as long as he fairly (or in good faith) attempts to provide his ward with property of equivalent value.
If he does that, he cannot be faulted if hindsight should demonstrate a lack of precise equivalence. On the other
hand, if a trustee (or the government in its dealings with the Indians) does not attempt to give the ward the fair
equivalent of what he acquires from him, the trustee to that extent has taken rather than transmuted the property
of the ward. In other words, an essential element of the inquiry under the FortBerthold guideline is determining
the adequacy of the consideration the government gave for the Indian lands it acquired. That inquiry cannot be
avoided by the government's simple assertion that it acted in good faith in its dealings with the Indians."). Simply
stated, the federal government must choose whether it is exercising its power of eminent domain, in which case
it must pay fair compensation, or whether it is managing the beneficiary's corpus, in which case it must adequately
attempt to provide property of equivalent value to the beneficiary.
127. See supra Part IILA-B.
128. Numerous federal statutes such as the Tribal Self Governance Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. § 458aa-hh
(2000), have developed tribal autonomy recognized again as essential under the IRA of 1934 to fulfill the federal
trust obligation. The IRA was the first attempt of Congress to rectify breach of its trust obligation to Tribes that
was clearly abrogated by the Allotment Era. See also discussion supra Part III.C.
129. The standard of review with respect to non-members appealing tribal jurisdiction is de novo because
challenge of tribal jurisdiction is itself a federal question of law. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe,
471 U.S. 845,852 (1985). But where Indian rights are implicated and the relief sought is abrogation of these rights,
the broadest possible scope is to be favored in resolving ambiguities in favor of Indians with respect to treaties,
statutes, and contracts. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713,732-33 (1983). But see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978), supersededin part by statute,Pub. L. No. 101-511 § 8077(b) (1990) (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000)), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 205-07 (2004) (denying
tribal court jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indian non-members in Indian country with respect to misdemeanor
criminal violations of tribal codes); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (denying tribal agencies the
power to regulate non-Indian non-members within reservation land); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990),
supersededby statute, Pub. L. No. 101-511 § 8077(b) (1990) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000)),
as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 205-07 (2004) (extending Oliphant to deny tribal court
jurisdiction of Indian non-members in Indian country with respect to misdemeanor criminal violations of tribal
codes); see also discussion infra Part Ii.D.
130. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); see also discussion infra Part In.D.
131. But see The Judicial Branch of the Navajo Nation, http://www.navajocourts.org/ (last visited May 24,
2008) (showing developed court systems and procedures); The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic
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with the spirit of Morton v. Mancari and Sioux Nation, could instead develop a
tendency to encroach upon tribal governments by proscribing their powers.' 32 The
Court has readily been able to encroach upon tribal governments by citation to
Kagama,'3 3 in particular, which does not recognize tribal sovereigns.134
D. "Lochnerizing" Self-Determination
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe135 begins the disconnect between congressional policy and modem Supreme Court jurisprudence. As commentators Johnson
and Martinis note, "Congress had learned, primarily through trial and error, that the
right of Indian tribes to self-determination must be protected. Rehnquist has yet to
acknowledge this congressional discovery." 136
In Oliphant, Justice Rehnquist held that tribal courts have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, even for tribal code crimes. 137 Justice Rehnquist announced
a new test based on "unspoken assumption" or "commonly shared presumption" to
determine that Congress implied that Tribes did not retain criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians rather than utilize the "clear and plain intention" canon of construction
previously applicable to abrogation of Indian rights. 3 Thus, "Justices can engage
in a mystical game of reading the mind of Congress... to justify any change in legal
doctrine the Court chooses to make., 139 But as Johnson and Martinis note, "Congress passed many laws dealing with Indians. Congress did not rely on the courts
to discern its 'unspoken assumption' when interpreting laws. Congressional silence
14
really means what it is commonly supposed to mean-absolutely nothing."'
Negative implication by way of congressional and judicial silence allows the
Court to abuse its discretion regarding tribal jurisdiction. Johnson and Martinis
suggest that the dependent domestic status of Tribes in Cherokee related to
proscribing the Tribes' sovereign status only in an international context. In this way,
4
Tribes could not compete with the United States in the arena of foreign policy.' '
Oliphant,however, explicitly rejects this proposition and holds that Congress also
implicitly proscribes Tribes' sovereign status internally.4 4 But the Marshall Court
did not intend dependency in an internal context because Congress can act by

Development, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied/hn/hn-1999_law.htm (last visited May 24, 2008) (discussing
the Navajo court system's preference for statutory and written common law as well as describing extensive
regulated procedures and opportunities for alternative dispute resolution); see also discussion infra Parts I11.D,
IV.B.
132.
133.

See discussion infra Part II.D.
118 U.S. 375 (1886); accord Oliphant v. Suquamisli Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,212 (1978); Nevada

v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 363-64 (2001).
134.
135.

Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379.
435 U.S. 191 (1978).

136. Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, ChiefJustice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 PUB. LAND.
L. REV. 1, 7 (1995).
137. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.
138. Id. at 203, 206,208 n. 17; see also Johnson & Martinis, supra note 136, at 12; see also Choate v. Trapp,
224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912) (holding that "doubtful expressions, instead of being resolved in favor of the United
States, are to be resolved in favor of weak and defenseless people, who are wards of the nation, and dependent
wholly upon its protection and good faith").
139. Johnson & Martinis, supranote 136, at 12.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 14.
142. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204.
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passing legislation protecting the interests of the dominant state.'43 "[A]pplying
[dependent domestic nation] status in this context gives the Court unprincipled
discretion to decide the extent of tribal court jurisdiction.""
Unprincipled discretion in the context of Indian law decisions relies on rejecting
the initial understanding of Tribes as enunciated by the Marshall court. It is
revealing that Oliphant, a modem case, cites Kagama145 for the proposition that
there are only two sovereigns in the United States: the federal government and the
States. 46 Such jurisprudence confirms the continuing Lone Wolf line of case law
that is hostile to the initial understanding of Indian nations that existed previous to
Anglo invasion: separate political entities endowed with inherent sovereignty. 4 7
Such jurisprudence standing as good Indian
law confirms that judicial review per
48
Sioux Tribe is merely in an infant stage.
Revision of tribal inherent sovereignty by way of Oliphant enabled further
judicial encroachment in Montanav. UnitedStates.149 There, Justice Stewart wrote,
"exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government
or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the
tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation." 5 0 Montana
proscribed the power of a Tribe to regulate hunting and fishing with respect to nonIndians living on non-Indian fee land within its reservation.' 51 The Court held that
regulation of non-Indians by tribal law is possible only where (1) the non-Indian is
in a consensual commercial relationship with the Tribe or (2) the regulation is
necessary to protect "the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe."' 152 The Court has construed both Montana exceptions very
narrowly. "
The Court attempted to retreat from the judicial encroachment explicit in
Oliphant and furthered in Montana when it announced its tribal court exhaustion
rule in National FarmersUnion InsuranceCos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians.154 There,

143. See Johnson & Martinis, supra note 136, at 14.
144. Id.
145. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
146. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211.
147. See Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal
Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1214 (2001) (discussing that when the modem court in the era of selfdetermination is faced with an individual issue concerning tribal sovereignty, the court draws on more than the
"Marshall trilogy and recent pronouncements by the President and Congress about the inherent sovereignty of
tribes. Rather, they draw on the whole messy, conflicted and conflicting doctrinal and legislative history."); see also
discussion supra Part Ill.A.
148. See discussion supra Part III.C, notes 119-127 and accompanying text.
149. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
150. Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 566-67.
152. Id. at 565-66.
153. Id. at 566 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1980); Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976)). The cases cited suggest that inherent tribal sovereignty means
limited power to tax and regulate internal family relations respectively. Accord Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S.
438 (1997); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
154. 471 U.S. 845 (1985). But see Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364-65 (holding that "the States inherent jurisdiction
on reservations" precludes a tribal member from bringing a tort action in tribal court against a state official in his
or her individual capacity for alleged damages occurring on tribal land). The opinion relies substantially on
Kagama for its authority. Id. at 363-64.
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the Court limited its holding in Oliphant to preempt tribal jurisdiction only with
respect to imposing criminal penalties on non-Indians.'5 5 Where civil jurisdiction
regarding a non-Indian presumptively lies in the tribal courts, a tribal court has a
right to determine its jurisdiction with respect to the litigation.' 56
National Farmers properly recognized Congress's commitment to self-determination, concluding that a non-Indian party challenging a Tribe's jurisdiction
undercuts this policy. 51 7 The rule requires exhaustion of tribal remedies, including
tribal appellate review where available. 158 Such exhaustion should only be
foreclosed where jurisdiction is clearly lacking or exhaustion is intended only to
harass or is futile. 159 But the rule was remade as "prudential" rather than jurisdictional in Strate v. A-1 Contractorson the grounds that challenge of tribal jurisdiction is itself a federal question.'
In conclusion, competing strands of Indian case law have historically operated
to inform diametrically opposed congressional Indian policies.'61 Both Montanaand
National Farmersillustrate the remnants of unstable legislative resolve and competing strands of Indian law today, barely subject to judicial review, perpetuating
a mostly incoherent jurisprudence.' 62 This Comment submits that the Court has not
matured to the level of the Congress with respect to Indian self-determination and,
as such, is reliving the sins of Lochner v. New York.' 63
In Lochner, the Court rejected a state law that set a maximum cap on the number
of hours each week that a professional baker could work."6 The Court rejected the
notion that the statute had any reasonable relationship to safety. 165 Instead, the Court
ruled that a restriction on hours that a baker could work was a violation of the
liberty of the individual employer
or employee to contract, which is protected by the
66
Fourteenth Amendment. 1
Lochner and its progeny, decided at the height of laissez-faire capitalism, enabled
the Court to strike down socially progressive legislation that States proffered in an
67
attempt to exercise legitimate use of their police power to protect their citizens.
Decades later, Lochner was eventually overruled by Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma.168 There, the Court retreated from judicial encroachment, adopting
rational basis review in an effort to defer to state legislatures. 169 As Justice Douglas

155. Nat'l Farmers,471 U.S. at 854, 855.
156. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19-20 (1987) (affirming National Farmersexhaustion rule
in diversity cases).
157. Nat'l Farmers,471 U.S. at 856.
158. Id.

159. Id. at 857 n.21.
160. 520 U.S. 438, 450 (1997).
161. See discussion supra Part lI.A-B.
162. See generally Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in
FederalIndian Law, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1754 (1997).
163. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
164. Id. at 65.
165. Id. at62-63.
166. Id. at 64.
167. KATHLEEN M. SuLuIvAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 376-84 (16th ed. 2007)
(discussing the rise and fall of the Lochner era).
168. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
169. Id. at487-88.
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noted in Lee Optical,"The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and
industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony
with a particular school of thought."' 170 Thus, Lee Optical suggests that the Lochner
to the exclusion
Court's elevation of a constitutional principle, freedom of contract,
171
of other valid considerations is an essential flaw of Lochner.
Like the justices in Lochner,7 1 Justice Rehnquist in Oliphant173 elevated the
United States' "great solicitude that its citizens be protected.. .from unwarranted
intrusions on their personal liberty" above the legitimate police powers of the
Tribe. 74 This dicta was penned despite the fact that the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968'7 incorporated most of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to apply to "any"
person subject to the jurisdiction of the tribal courts. 176 Furthermore, the Court
could find no explicit preemption of Tribes' inherent power to regulate conduct
even among non-members with respect to minor crimes that occurred on reservation
lands. 177 Finally, Justice Rehnquist conceded the fact that any attempt to abrogate
Indian rights must be explicitly indicated by Congress. 718Thus, it was necessary for
the Court to presume that the legislative history of Congress implied this result. 179
jurisdiction afforded
The Court chose, sua sponte, withdrawal of any criminal
180
Tribes regarding a non-member on reservation land.
Like Lochner, Oliphant and its progeny continue to frustrate the development of
tribal court power because the modem Court has not yet extended rational basis
review to tribal legislatures. For example, in Duro v. Reina,'81 the Court extended
182
Oliphant to preclude a Tribe from criminally prosecuting a non-member Indian.
Amici on behalf of Tribes showed that historical ties and substantial inter-tribal
marriage among Tribes, as a consequence of past federal Indian policy, are
common. 83 Amici further argued that as a practical matter inherent sovereignty
would mean little if regulation of a non-member Indian was denied.' 84 Congress
superseded the Court's ruling by passing subsequent legislation one year after Duro

170. Id. at 488.
171. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689
(1984).
172. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
173. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
174. See id. at 210.
175. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2000).
176. Id. §§ 1302, 1303.
177. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208 n.17.
178. Id. (acknowledging the canon of construction that requires ambiguities in treaty and statutory law to
be resolved in favor of Indians).
179. See id. at 197, 203, 206.
180. Id. at 204.
181. 495 U.S. 676 (1990), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 101-511 § 8077(b) (1990) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000)), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 205-07 (2004).
182. Id. at 679.
183. See Brief for Rosebud Sioux Tribe et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Duro,495 U.S. 676
(No. 88-6546), 1989 WL 1126953.
184. Id.
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that recognized the power of a Tribe to assert criminal jurisdiction over all Indians
within its reservation. 185
Duro might suggest that Congress does not want tribal courts to assert jurisdiction over non-Indians, because Congress could have just as easily acted to correct
earlier rulings such as Oliphantand Montana.186 Notwithstanding political realities
on the ground, this assumption proves too much. Congress had always sought to
assimilate the Tribes into dual federalism and relax its trust relationship with
Tribes.' 87 But policies of compelled assimilation have been failures that have
necessitated the continuing need for trust doctrine. 8 8 Self-determination is
consistent with trust doctrine because it affords real mechanisms for inherent
sovereignty."' But at the same time, self-determination presents Congress with the
best opportunity to relax its trust responsibility because healthy tribal governments
should be able to independently provide for tribal needs over time.' 90
It stands to reason that healthy tribal governments will also benefit States
precisely because Tribes have not been incorporated under the protection of the
States in a dual federalism model.'91 But centuries of historic animosity between
States and Tribes will take time to overcome. It will be overcome when non-Indians
and the courts are educated about the organic and cultural differences between
States and Tribes.
Duro is essentially an affirmation of this education in process because Congress
passed legislation that superseded it within a year after the decision.' 9 2 Thus, selfdetermination as a fledgling policy was vindicated and enforced by Congress.
Therefore, the erroneous presumption of silence in Oliphant should not extend to
Durojust because Congress superseded it by statute. Oliphant and Montana stand
as good law because self-determination is newly established policy that will take
time to become reality.
Returning to the Marshall Court, in Marbury v. Madison,193 Chief Justice John
Marshall confirmed judicial review, stating, "It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws
conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each."' 94 But
unlike the spirit of judicial restraint found in Lee Optical,195 the modern Court
seems to exercise its inherent power to strike down tribal laws because such laws
are "out of harmony" with a discredited school of thought as determined by
Congress: forced assimilation into a two-sovereign system.' 96 Thus, judicial

185. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2000).
186. See Frickey, supra note 162, at 1770-75.
187. See discussion supra Part HiI.A-B.
188. See Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974); see also discussion, supraPart IHL.B.
189. See discussion supraParts II.B-C.
190. See discussion supraPart T.C; infra Part IV.B.
191. Ronald N. Johnson, Indian Casinos:Another Tragedyofthe Commons, in SELF-DETERMINATION, supra
note 22, at 214, 218-20.
192. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2000); see discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
193. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
194. Id. at 177.
195. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
196. Getches, supra note 17, at 274-76 (discussing the fact that since 1992, the Court has only twice cited
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by the will of
encroachment will continue to "Lochnerize" tribal courts empowered
197
Congress, and this undermines the integrity of the Court.
Tribal self-determination is fundamentally sound and necessary to a democratic
nation that includes among its citizens the Indian peoples.1 98 But "new" and born
in a time of neo-colonialism, self-determination will be "Lochnerized" for some
time to come until the Court realizes the errors of its ways.
IV. NEW MEXICO AND CHEROMIAH
A. Cheromiah and Its Teachings
Because the judiciary has not matured to the level of the Congress regarding the
necessity of tribal self-determination, it is generally to the benefit of States and
Tribes in economic relationships to stay out of the federal courts. As Philip Frickey
remarked, the Court imposes a "one size fits all" solution where "Congress has the
capacity to operate-on a local basis, attempting to find ways to work with individual
Indian Tribes, and with the States and counties that include their reservations, to
reach practical, functional resolutions of problems.. .without any federal involvement at all." 199 If federal litigation is eminent, however, Cheromiah2° teaches ways
to bend the court toward tribal autonomy, which is important to New Mexico.
Cheromiahis an example of preserving a courtroom opinion in favor of tribal
law, ultimately settled out of federal court during interlocutory appeal.2 ' Michael
Cheromiah was an enrolled member of Laguna Pueblo and sought medical attention
for chest and respiratory pains at a federally operated Indian Health Service (IHS)
clinic located within Acoma tribal lands.2 2 Despite repeated visits to the clinic over
a period of a week, Michael Cheromiah was continually dismissed and accused of
"faking it" and being "a wimp."2 3 Michael Cheromiah eventually fell into a state
of paralysis due to shock, and on his final visit to the clinic was air lifted to an
Albuquerque hospital.2" There, he died that same day of cardiac arrest due to a hole
in his heart caused by a misdiagnosed and untreated bacterial infection.20 5 Had he
been correctly diagnosed, Michael Cheromiah would have survived due to his

the Marshall trilogy for support in its majority opinions, ignored "nearly all of its approximately eighty modem era
decisions," and instead has opted to create new case law that posits aberrant special rules concerning non-Indians).
Indian law has always been based on the assumption that separate societies could exist exempt
from the American melting pot, preserving customs, values, and governance of the vestiges of
traditional tribal territory....
[R]eliance on Congress to decide clearly the bounds of Indian sovereignty-the Court's
primary approach until the mid-1980s-has nearly disappeared.
Id. at 276; see also discussion supra Part 11l.B.
197. See discussion supraPart IlI.D.
198. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000).
199. Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, InstitutionalRelationships, and Commentary: The Malaise of
FederalIndian Law Through the Lens of Lone Wolf, 38 TULSA L. REV. 5, 10 (2002).
200. 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D.N.M. 1999).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1297.
203. Interview with Randi McGinn, Senior Partner, McGinn, Carpenter, Montoya, and Love, P.A., in
Albuquerque, NM (Oct. 8, 2006).
204. Id.
205. Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1297.
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generally good health and young age.2" Michael Cheromiah was twenty years
old.2" 7 His father and mother, enrolled members of the Laguna and Acoma tribes,
respectively, brought the wrongful death action on behalf of their son under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), claiming that tribal law should govern the
action."'
The court stated in its opinion that it did not have evidence of title regarding the
status of the land on which the malpractice occurred in order to determine tribal
jurisdiction.2" To be safe, the court applied a Montana analysis.2 1° It found that a
consensual contract to provide medical services was formed between a non-Indian
party (IHS) and the Acoma Tribe and thus met the first Montana exception. 21' The
court found that the second Montana exception was also met where practically the
only western medical care for most of the Tribe was provided for by the IHS
clinic.212 If IHS were allowed to continue its malpractice with impunity, the court
reasoned that the political integrity of Acoma Pueblo was threatened because its
very survival would continue to be at stake. 213 Thus, the district court found "that
if the United States were a private person, it could be sued in Acoma Tribal Court
for the alleged negligence of its agents" and that "the Acoma Tribe is the relevant
political entity who controls the jurisdiction in which the alleged tort occurred. 214
The Cheromiahcourt applied a plain meaning construction to the FTCA statutory
language "law of the place" where the act of omission occurred to determine that
25
Acoma tribal law controlled this medical malpractice/wrongful death action.
Judge Vazquez issued an interlocutory appeal and ordered the parties to submit trial
briefs outlining the application of Acoma tribal law. 21'6 Before briefs were due and
the trial commenced, the federal government settled the case for $675,000, $75,000
in excess of the New Mexico Medical Malpractice damages cap.21 7 Randi McGinn,
attorney for the plaintiff, stated that settlement was strategic on her part in order to
guarantee that a written opinion applying tribal customary law to a tort action would
not be disturbed on appeal. 218 The federal government, for its part, presumably
settled without appealing because it did not want to risk setting a precedent or
expend court costs and time equaling or exceeding the amount of settlement.21 9

206. McGinn Interview, supra note 203.
207. Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1297.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1304.
210. Id. at 1304-05. Judge Vazquez referred to the fact that the court was provided no evidence of title as
"unfortunate." Id. In other words, she implicated sloppy lawyering and proceeded to undertake a Montana analysis
for counsel to determine tribal civil jurisdiction. See also discussion supra Part II.D, notes 151-153 and
accompanying text.
211. Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1304.
212. Id. at 1305.
213. See id.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 1306-07.
216. Id. at 1310.
217. Scott Sandlin, TribalLaw Used in Negligence Suit Against the U.S., ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug. 9, 1999,
at Al.
218. McGinn Interview, supra note 203.
219. Id.
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Cheromiahexposes an alleged conflict with New Mexico state law, which in turn
reveals the animus tribal members might expect if they litigate in a federal forum
and wish to apply tribal law.22 ° After determining that the United States could be
sued, the United States mounted a defense relying on a recent decision preceding
Cheromiahin the federal district court, Louis v. UnitedStates. 221 Louis essentially
had the same facts as Cheromiah,but the court ruled in favor of applying state law
under the FTCA. 22
In Louis, the judge did not consider the possibility of applying tribal law as "the
law of the place" where the act or omission occurred, because such precedent was
not presented by tribal advocates. 223 Thus, the court did not foreclose the possibility
that an FTCA action applying tribal law could be legitimate. 4 It has long been
established that lex loci delicti (law of the place of the injury) is where the tort
occurs, and that tort actions are judged by local community standards. 25 Thus, in
Cheromiah,it was easier to distinguish Louis because precedent that applied the law
of politicalentities to a tort action was briefed for the court.22 6 In Cheromiah,Judge
Vazquez noted, "the fact that [applying tribal law] has never been done, standing
alone, does not mean that it is not what the law requires.2 2 7
In Cheromiah, the court quoted Louis, where it was argued that applying tribal
law would "subject the United States to varying and often unpredictable degrees of
liability depending on the reservation that was the site of the occurrence." 2 8 The
Cheromiahcourt, however, noted that the United States already had varying degrees
of liability with respect to Tribes by hundreds of treaties that were still in force. 9
Further, the court did not want to speculate how much of a "varying degree of
liability" the FTCA allowed, since it clearly intended to allow varying liability by
exposing the United States to suit with respect to applying various States' laws. 30
Finally, the United States attempted to plead a conflict of law when it argued that
the plaintiff s wrongful death action was dependent on the New Mexico wrongful
death statute because such action was not recognized at common law.2 ' Briefly

220. See Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1308.
221. 54 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D.N.M. 1999). New Mexico attorney Randi McGinn also represented the plaintiff
in this action. Id. at 1208.
222. Id. at 1210. In Louis, plaintiff, an enrolled member of the Acoma pueblo, alleged negligent pre-natal
medical care at an IHS hospital that ultimately led to the death of her newborn daughter. Id. at 1208.
223. Id. at 1210 (noting cases that applied state law regarding actions arising on tribal land).
224. Id. at 1210 n.5 (citing Montana, the court noted that it must determine the ownership status of the land
where the tort occurred for purposes of determining tribal jurisdiction, but that it was not presented with any factual
elements in this regard).
225. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1962).
226. See Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1305-08 (D.N.M. 1999). The court noted:
In Puerto Rico, the law of Puerto Rico is applied, Soto v. United States, 11 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir.
1993), Borrego v. United States, 790 F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir. 1986); In Guam, the law of Guam is
applied, Taberv. Maine,67 F.3d 1029,1033 (2ndCir. 1995)....None of these entities are states.
Yet, they are the "political entities" in whose jurisdiction the alleged tort occurred. Thus, theirs
is "the law of the place" that controls the FrCA action.
Id. at 1302.
227. Id. at 1306.
228. Id. at 1307.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 1308.
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stated, a conflict of law occurs "whenever two or more states have a connection to
a case and an issue arises as to which their respective laws differ, a choice of law
must be made. ' 232 In other words, the United States intended to dismiss plaintiff's
suit for failure to state a claim under New Mexico law, but the Cheromiah court
recognized that this reasoning was irrelevant to Acoma law, owing to the Tribe's
independent status as a separate political entity.233
LaFromboisev. Leavitt,234 another FTCA case that came after Cheromiah,ruled

against application of tribal law.235 LaFromboise is remarkable because it cites
Cheromiahto dismiss its "singular" statutory interpretation of the FTCA, yet it does
not mention case law therein that applied the law of political entities to FTCA
actions.236 Thus, LaFromboiseshows entrenchment of the incorrect notion that there
are only state and federal sovereigns in the United States237and, by logical extension,
only state or federal law could control an FTCA claim.
Cheromiahis intriguing because it shows the United States arguing (1) an alleged
conflict of law with respect to the nature of Tribes and the New Mexico wrongful
death statute and (2) the erroneous preclusion of tribal laws by state laws at large
with respect to the intent of its own FTCA statute. Thus, Cheromiah exposes
animus that is directed toward Tribes and their governments within the federal
judiciary, even though the case is almost singular in its "victory., 238 Cheromiahalso
reveals the federal courts playing on the fears that non-Indian members entertain
regarding the "capricious and arbitrary" nature of tribal courts.2 39
If Cheromiahwere appealed, there is a substantial likelihood that "outsider fears"
would have reversed this decision, which is not in the best interest of New Mexico.
Reversal would have incorrectly applied state law in compliance with Louis and
LaFromboise because the Acoma Pueblo was the relevant political entity that
controlled the jurisdiction in which the alleged tort occurred. As the case stands
now, it suggests possible methods for future litigators to diminish neo-colonial
impulses of the modern judiciary.24
Cheromiahdelivers a rich opinion that serves as a metaphor for New Mexico and
the Tribes within its midst: Cheromiahis the dead man that talks. In plain language,
this case settled before trial and showed that it is possible to move the modern

232. DAVIDD. SIEGEL& PATRICK J. BORCHERS, CONFLICTS INA NUTSHELL § 5, at 5 (3d ed. 2005) (emphasis
added).
233. See Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1308.

234. 439 F.3d 792 (8th Cir. 2006). The facts of this case are essentially the same as those of Cheromiahin
that a parent tribal member brings an FTCA claim against the federal government on behalf of her child for alleged
malpractice occurring at an IHS facility on tribal land. Id. at 792-93.
235. Id. at 796.
236. Id. at 794.
237. See id. at 796.
238. See Cheromiah,55 F. Supp. 2d at 1305. The court noted, "taking into consideration the limited scope

of the second Montana exception...the court finds that this is one of the unique situations.. .[where] the second
Montana exception applies as well." Id.
239. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384-85 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting concern that
the Indian Civil Rights Act is not identical to the Bill of Rights; tribal judges may not be independent structurally
as determined by tribal governments; tribal mixture of state, federal, and unwritten law may be "unusually difficult
for an outsider to sort out"; and risk of "substantial disuniformity" exists when tribes interpret state and federal
law); see also discussion supra Part II.C-D and text accompanying notes 172-175.
240.- See also discussion supraPart LD.
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federal judiciary again toward principled decisions.24 1 But at the same time,
LaFromboise confirms the wisdom of Cheromiah tribal advocates avoiding the
judiciary's current hostility toward self-determination by not going to trial in a
federal forum.2 42 Therefore, the case implies that Tribes and States are better served
to develop tribal precedent in either state or tribal forums for the time being.
B. New Mexico and Tribes in Partnership:Pilfalls

Cheromiahis a hollow victory because the case did not apply Acoma tribal law
to the merits and set a precedent, which should be possible in a federal district
court.243 Cheromiahteaches, and commentators agree, that an essential problem of
promoting stability and economic growth on reservations is the lack of accessible
tribal precedent necessary to establish integrity in a tribal judiciary. 2" Therefore,
New Mexico and the Tribes should develop consistent, accessible tribal law precedent, because they are already in significant economic and political partnerships.245
Such partnership between States and Tribes is possible without abrogating the
federal trust responsibility. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA)246
shows the three sovereigns in pure agreement. Under this Act, the federal legislature
lessens the trust yoke, thereby increasing capital on trust lands by allowing Tribes
to contract with States. Next, States guarantee Tribes "substantial exclusivity" in
class I gaming, in return getting a percentage of annual wins. For example, New
Mexico law provides that the Tribe is not obligated to share 16 percent of its annual
net wins with New Mexico if the State allows any expansion of non-tribal Class I1
gaming.247 As a result, the Tribes are infused with billions of dollars in revenue.248
To date, eleven New Mexico Tribes participate in the IGRA. 249 From the Act's
inception in 1988 to 2003, approximately forty percent of Tribes across the United
States have realized annual revenues growing from 188 million dollars to 16.8
billion dollars respectively. 250 This 2003 figure equals the annual revenues of both

241. See discussion supraPart IV.A.
242. See discussion supraPart IV.A.

243. See United States v. Tsosie, 849 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.M. 1994). There, the judge remanded a tribal land
dispute between tribal members to tribal court sua sponte under NationalFarmersabstention doctrine. Id. at 775.

But both parties, advanced in age and weary of the twenty-five-year litigation, wanted the case to proceed in federal
district court. Id. at 771. The respondent had attached an affidavit from a former tribal chief justice outlining
pertinent tribal law. Id. at 774-75.
244. David D. Haddock & Robert J. Miller, Sovereignty Can Be a Liability: How Tribes Can Mitigate the
Sovereign'sParadox,in SELF-DETERMINATION, supranote 22, at 210-11; Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts:
Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225, 233 (1994). The Oklahoma BarJournalfrequently publishes
tribal court decisions and other Indian law cases that affect that State and the Tribes within it. See, e.g.,
http://www.okbar.org/obj/articles 06/feb_06.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2007).

245. Many Tribes maintain websites where tribal law precedent can be accessed. An online Indian law
reporter can be found at http://www.versuslaw.com/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
246. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000).
247. NMSA 1978, § 11-13-2(4)(B) (1997).
248. Ronald N. Johnson, Indian Casinos:Another Tragedy ofthe Commons, in SELF-DETERMINATION, supra
note 22, at 214, 218-20.
249. Indian Gaming, http://www.indiangaming.com/associations/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
250. Johnson, supra note 248, at 221.
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Nevada and New Jersey Class Ill gaming (slot machine and table games)
combined.25 1
Significant political agreements between New Mexico and Tribes within the
State are also evolving. New Mexico has statutorily provided for deputation of tribal
and pueblo police to act as New Mexico police officers in either "hot pursuit" or the
routine citation of traffic violations outside of Indian country.252 In addition, New
Mexico and Tribes are now sharing Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) data-base
information on offenses between the twojurisdictions.253 Such cooperation between
traditional police powers of both sovereigns protects all citizens, with the added
benefit of conserving government resources. New Mexico-tribal agreements
represent two of many substantial inter-governmental agreements between States
and Tribes nationally.254 One commentator has described these agreements as a
"movement of sweeping importance. 255
State-tribal agreements essentially affirm the old adage "time is money." It stands
to reason that New Mexico and the Tribes should not want to waste time and money
when disputes that arise with respect to gaming compacts or other contracts would
likely result in such waste in a federal forum.
Tamiami Partners,Limited v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians256 is an example of
such waste when Indian contracts are allowed to be interpreted in federal court.
Tamiami Partners Limited (TPL) invested 6.5 million dollars in 1990 to buy land
for the Miccosukee Tribe to construct a bingo hall.257 Disputes arose and the Tribe
filed a suit in tribal court. 258 TPL immediately filed a federal lawsuit to enforce the
agreement's arbitration clause and to enjoin the Tribe from taking control of the
operation. 259 The trial court determined that the Tribe waived its sovereign
immunity by agreeing to an arbitration clause, but stayed proceedings until TPL
exhausted its tribal court remedies.26 °
The Tribe appealed to the Eleventh Circuit and won a judgment that the federal
district court had no subject matterjurisdiction. 261 After TPL filed a new complaint,
the district court determined that it did have subject matter jurisdiction, but
sovereign immunity barred TPL's claim against the Tribe and its agencies, except
individual defendants.262 After all parties appealed, the court upheld its jurisdiction,
defeated TPL's breach of contract claim (finding that waiver of immunity applied

251. Id.
252. NMSA 1978, § 29-1-11(C)(8)(2005).
253. Governor Richardson's Policy Initiatives: DWI, Office of New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson,
http://www.govemor.state.nm.us/priorities-dwi.php?nm=4 (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
254. wILKINsON, supra note 48, at 109 & n.156 (listing extensive inter-governmental agreements between
Tribes and States across the United States).
255. Id.
256. 63 F.3d 1030 (11 th Cir. 1995).
257. Id. at 1038.
258. Id. at 1039-40.
259. Id. at 1040.
260. Id. at 1040-41.
261. Id. at 1043.
262. Id. at 1045.
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only to suits regarding arbitration), and upheld TPL's claim against individual tribal
members.263
But years later and still in litigation, the Eleventh Circuit found TPL's second
amended complaint was "a thinly-disguised attempt... to obtain specific performance of the Tribe's obligations" by suing individual defendants. 2' Because the
suit was construed to be against the Tribe, sovereign immunity protected the
individuals. 265 The court remanded the case again for trial on the arbitration issues,
where the reach of tribal immunity rather than fact is still being litigated.26 6
Tamiami Partnersillustrates the cost to both Tribes and States when the federal
judiciary grapples with understanding its own tribal exhaustion doctrine and tends
to read tribal sovereign immunity very narrowly. Tribal court exhaustion, required
in the State of New Mexico,267 is seen as costless by the courts but not by
investors. 268 As commentators suggest, "it may be fair that disputes concerning
matters on a reservation require non-members to litigate against members in tribal
courts. But a Tribe cannot deposit 'fair' in the bank. ' 269 This proposition creates a
dilemma, because non-Indian investors see the application of tribal law as
unpredictable and generally do not want to litigate in tribal court. 270 Tribes, on the
other hand, have historically been faced with animus and bias when litigating in a
state forum, and generally prefer to litigate in tribal court.27'
Commentators have suggested that solutions to the dilemma of mistrust between
outsiders and Tribes might be found in Tribes stipulating to carefully crafted
waivers of sovereign immunity in contracts they execute with outsiders. 272 "The
tribe would not be compelled to waive any immunity, but it could dependably do
so whenever waivers were to its advantage., 273 States and the federal government
can adopt general class-wide waivers to attract investors unknown to them in
advance, but the Tribes must follow an individualized process subject to BIA
approval for waivers that affect trust property. 27' This means that an investor that
bears the cost of contract negotiations with a Tribe might have plans frustrated after
the fact by
the BIA if a Tribe does not waive immunity---even if the Tribe wants the
27 5
project.
276
In the alternative, C&L Enterprisesv. Citizen Band PotawatomiIndian Tribe
indicates that a carefully constructed arbitration clause can waive sovereign
immunity without mentioning it. There, the Court agreed unanimously that waiver

263. Id. at 1051.
264. Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 177 F.3d 1212, 1225 (11th Cir. 1999).
265. Id. at 1226.
266. Haddock & Miller, supra note 244, at 206.
267. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley, 115 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1997).
268. See Haddock & Miller, supranote 244, at 203.
269. Id. at 204.
270. See Valencia-Weber, supranote 244, at 245.
271. Id. at 233.
272. Haddock & Miller, supra note 244, at 208; Katherine J. Florey, Choosing Tribal Law: Why State
Choice-of-Law PrinciplesShould Apply to Disputes with Tribal Contacts,55 AM. U. L. REv. 1627, 1691 (2006).
273. See Haddock & Miller, supra note 244, at 208.
274. Id. at 205.
275. Id.
276. 532 U.S. 411 (2001).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

was indicated by two provisions."' The first provision adopted a national trade
organization's arbitration rules and allowed for final judgment by an arbitrator.278
The second provision included a choice of law clause that read, "The contract shall
'
Therefore,
be governed by the law of the place where the Project is located."279
C&L Enterprisesindicates that a carefully tailored arbitration clause, "with teeth"
acceptable to Tribes, could be an efficient resource rather than fodder for the federal
courts to destructively examine its exhaustion and immunity doctrines.280
An association of like-minded Tribes could also pre-designate an arbitrator with
specific options regarding waivers of immunity. 28' A member Tribe that rejects the
arbitrator's decision could be evicted from the group's charter, which in this
instance could designate the tribal court as a proper forum to pay a judgment to the
aggrieved investor from the offending Tribe's assets held in the jurisdictions.282
Furthermore, it has been suggested that Tribes might alter generic IRA constitutions
to include a provision similar to United States Constitution Article I, Section 10,
where governments are prohibited from interfering with contracts. 283 As commentators Haddock and Miller note, "A far-sighted sovereign has an incentive to form a
reputation that shows that investors within its realm will not find the returns from
their investments confiscated or destroyed as a result of the sovereign's opportunism or capriciousness. ' 2 4
This section has indicated that States and Tribes in significant partnerships
should work together to increase their gains rather than deplete their resources.28"
Historic distrust, however, between Tribes and outsiders typically throws jurisdic287 shows that modern federal
tional disputes into the federal courts.28 6 Cheromiah
courts are certainly capable of delivering principled decisions if the courts will
apply the law according to geographically based determinations of jurisdiction.2 88
But Cheromiah also teaches that in the wake of Oliphant289 and its progeny,
favorable decisions regarding self-determination in a federal forum are not likely
for the time being.290
This section also shows that incoherence generated by Oliphantoften leads to
costly delay with respect to tribal disputes between members and non-members in
the federal courts. 29' This happens when the judiciary tries to make sense of its
jurisprudence with respect to self-determination.29 2 Therefore, Tribes and private
parties have been in the best position to maintain efficiency in their dealings by
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. at 423.
Id. at415.
Id.
See discussion supraPart IV.B.
See Haddock & Miller, supra note 244, at 208-09.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 207; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
Haddock & Miller, supra note 244, at 207.
See discussion supranotes 246-255 and accompanying text.
See discussion supranotes 267-271 and accompanying text.
54 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D.N.M. 1999).
See discussion supraPart IV.A.
435 U.S. 191 (1978).
See generally discussion supra Part IV.A.
See generally discussion supra Part IV.B.
See supra notes 256-266 and accompanying text.
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partial waiver of tribal sovereign immunity, which allows for final judgment by
arbitration.293 But this vision does not mean that tribal governments and courts
should be the mirror image of state or federal courts. 2 94 Instead, this vision should
inform tribal and state courts to find similar mechanisms such as insurance and
escrow accounts that build trust between state and tribal partners. In the wake of
Cheromiah, many of these mechanisms are either explicit or implied.2 95
C. New Mexico and Cheromiah: Solutions
Cheromiahindicates that certifying questions of law is an available and excellent
strategy to develop trust between state and tribal courts. As illustrated by
Cheromiah,it has been noted that certifying tribal law questions is not "impossible"
when such questions received in a state court are not too complex, involving tribal
tort or commercial transactions.296 But of course, certification is more efficient in
allowing Tribes to answer difficult tribal law questions rather than allowing States
to struggle with these questions alone, and possibly memorialize tribal law
incorrectly.297
In the alternative, Tribes have applied choice of law principles in their codes,
allowing the application of state law for some actions.298 Likewise, a state court can
take judicial notice of tribal law when the issue is complex. 299 These procedural
mechanisms not only begin to develop an accessible record of tribal precedent, but
can also protect cultural aspects of Tribes that are highly individualized by nature.3"
Cheromiah reminds tribal advocates that applying the law of political entities is
possible and is an excellent strategy to develop trust between state and tribal
forums. Since Tribes are separate political entities, forum non conveniens could be
applied in state court to enable Tribes to have "a first crack" regarding a difficult
question of law where there is a tribal forum.3" 1 Cultural unfamiliarity and practical
problems of access to proof, obtaining witnesses, and geographical isolation from
a state court are typical reasons a judge might dismiss a case in favor of a more
appropriate foreign forum. 3° 2 These factors will often be present in the Indian law
context.303 Therefore, procedural mechanisms already exist to enable tribal and state
courts to get on with the business of developing precedent.

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

See supranotes 276-281 and accompanying text.
See Valencia-Weber, supra note 244, at 244-45.
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
See Florey, supra note 272, at 1692.
Id. at 1695.

298. Id. at 1694; see also, e.g., ORDINANCE PRESCRIBING A CODE OF LAW AND ORDER FOR THE PUEBLO DE

ACOMA INDIAN RESERVATION § 4(C) (1971) (stating that any matters not covered by Acoma or federal law will
be decided in accordance with the laws of New Mexico).
299. Florey, supra note 272, at 1692.
300. See Valencia-Weber, supra note 244, at 259-61.
301. See Florey, supra note 272, at 1693.
302. Id.; see also Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (b) (2000) ("In any State court proceeding for
the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within
the reservation of the Indian child's tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such
proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon the petition of either parent or
the Indian custodian or the Indian child's tribe: Provided,that such transfer shall be subject to declination by the
tribal court of such tribe.") (emphasis on the original).
303. Florey, supranote 272, at 1693.
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These mechanisms are efficient, and presumed de minimus in their costs, unlike
the costs of delay visited upon litigants in the current federal courts.3°4 Likewise,
these procedural mechanisms should diminish systemic hostility between state and
tribal parties once a mutually respectful body of precedent develops.3 °5 Such
precedent is needed for the federal courts to realize that self-determination is not a
mutually exclusive endeavor."
The lens of Cheromiah teaches that application of tribal law could be
documented in state court through creatively applying canons of construction,30 7
certifying questions of law, and strategic settlement (if tribal litigators are fortunate
enough to survive a Montana analysis). 3 8 As Professor Valencia-Weber has noted,
tribal law is legitimized in federal and state court decisions that record and affirm
tribal law.30 9 Such publication of tribal law by state and tribal courts can help allay
fears of outsiders that tribal law is idiosyncratic.310 The fact that publication of
Acoma law was not realized in federal court out of fear that an appeal would reverse
Cheromiah implies that tribal and state courts must undertake this important
endeavor for New Mexico.
The rise of tribal economic affluence through gaming and other contracts with
outsiders enabled by self-determination legislation demands a strong tribal
judiciary. 311 The State must seek knowledge from this judiciary to "get it right" and
help forge the necessary tribal law precedent that will enable the two sovereigns to
realize the greater economic health and welfare of their respective citizens. Both
sovereigns can bend a little toward each other through procedural and arbitration
mechanisms identified. Over time, Tribes and States similarly situated across the
nation might develop a generally consistent, mutually respectful, and efficient body
of law and procedure that will inform the federal judiciary and blunt its current neocolonial tendencies.
V. CONCLUSION
Indian law alternatively protects and forsakes tribal autonomy.312 Yet the courts,
Kagama notwithstanding, do not seriously doubt that there continue to be
preexisting sovereigns to the United States and its Constitution: Native American
Tribes.3 13
It is understandable that Native Americans would not trust a partnership with
States, especially after the not so distant Allotment and Termination eras.314 But it
has been Congress and the judiciary that have sold out the interests of tribal
304. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
305. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
306. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
307. The court synchronized a plain meaning canon ofconstruction of the FTCA language "law of the place"
with the Indian canon of construction where ambiguities in federal law should favor Tribes if Indian rights might
be abrogated. Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1308 (D.N.M. 1999).
308. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 217-219.
309. Valencia-Weber, supra note 244, at 249.
310. Id.
311. Seeid. at232.
312. See discussion supra Part I.
313. See discussion supra Part .
314. See discussion supra Part In.B.
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autonomy, not the States.3" 5 True, greed for land by territorial expansion
informed
3 16
the federal sovereign to forsake Tribes, but manifest destiny is over.
This Comment indicates that the modem era of self-determination has traction.3 17
Also, modem economic and political realities compel the States to develop a bona
fide partnership with Tribes in their midst."
Legal fictions with respect to the sovereign equality of the States and the inherent
sovereignty of dependent domestic nations have been realized.319 The exclusivity
of these two sovereigns is positive in the sense that it has tended to protect cultural
differences between Tribes and States. On the other hand, exclusivity has had
negative consequences in that previous attempts to force assimilation of Tribes
within the dominant scheme of dual federalism have been disastrous.320
United States federalism certainly allows for a heterogeneous population. 32' A
homogeneous population is not warranted or valuable in the context of a tribal
culture situated within a State. Here, cultural diversity should be celebrated and
understood to be to the benefit of all sovereigns in the United States. Apparently,
Congress has learned this.322
Congress has learned that the assimilationist assumptions subsumed in the
Marshall trilogy are best served, if at all, by the will of the Native American
Tribes. 323 The federal judiciary will eventually catch on that self-determination is
here to stay. But for now, it is up to the States and the Tribes to document this news
for the Court to read.

315. See discussion supra Part fI.
316. See discussion supra Part Mi.B.
317. See discussion supra Part I.C.
318. "Patchwork" or intermingled state and tribal jurisdiction as a result of the Allotment Era demands some
collaboration not only for mutually beneficial economic development, but also to protect the health and safety of
both sovereigns. See supranote 254 and accompanying text.
319. See discussion supraPart III.
320. See discussion supra Part II.
321. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating
that the "Framers split the atom of sovereignty... .The resulting Constitution.. .establish[ed] two orders of
government, each with its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed
by it.").
322. But see Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 177 (1989) (holding that States could
impose oil and gas severance taxes on non-Indian companies extracting oil and gas in Indian country, leaving the
companies subject to taxation by the Tribe and the State); see also Krakoff, supranote 147, at 1209 ("While Cotton
Petroleum ostensibly allows concurrent taxing authority by the State and tribe, as a practical matter it allows state
taxes to preempt tribal ones. Tribes rarely will succeed at convincing businesses to stay on their reservations if they
are subjected to triple taxation. Thus, the Court's decisions concerning the imposition of state taxes in Indian
Country have left tribes with uncertainties concerning their attempts at revenue collection."); discussion supraPart
Ill.
323. See discussion supraPart III.B-C.

